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How the Argument from Moral Knowledge Fails

The Argument from Moral Knowledge

In my last article, we closed by considering the following modification of the Argument from Moral Knowledge:

(1) For all we know, God is planning to allow Smith to copy the NIU and Virginia Tech shootings.

(2) Our not trying to interfere with God's plans is always morally permissible.

Therefore,

(3) For all we know, our not trying to interfere with Smith would be morally permissible.¹

As we saw, (1) and (2) entail (3), (3) seems obviously false, (2) seems obviously true, and rejecting (1) leaves us without any response to the Evidential Argument from Evil. If all of this is right, though, then it looks like, one way or another, there is a serious problem with belief in God.

An Ambiguity in (2)

As it turns out, the repaired version of the Argument from Moral Knowledge doesn't fare any better than the original version, which we rejected in my last article. To see why, note that (2) is highly ambiguous.²

Suppose you and I are playing chess. You're pretty good, and I'm just getting the hang of it. I've lost 10 games in a row. This time, in order to boost my spirits, you plan on losing — but just barely, so that it looks like you're trying to win. I'm kind of fed up with chess, though, so I want to get the game over as quickly as possible. I plan on losing too. So both of us plan on losing, but neither of us knows this.

Now, by trying to lose the game, am I thereby trying to interfere with your plans? The answer to this question depends on what we mean by "trying to interfere with your plans." Take the following sentences, for example:

(4) By trying to lose, I am trying to interfere with what actually are your plans.

(5) By trying to lose, I am trying to interfere with what I think are your plans.

(6) By trying to lose, I am trying to interfere with what might (for all I can tell) be your plans.

Given that you plan to lose, (4) is true. But I think you're trying to win, so (5) is false. And since you're trying to disguise the fact that you're trying to lose, it looks to me like you're trying to win. So (6) is false too. There is a difference, then, between (4), (5) and (6). This difference corresponds to an important ambiguity in (2):

(2a) Our not trying to interfere with what actually are God's plans is always morally permissible.

(2b) Our not trying to interfere with what we think are God's plans is always morally permissible.

(2c) Our not trying to interfere with what might (for all we can tell) be God's plans is always morally permissible.

The Argument from Moral Knowledge depends on (2), and whether or not (2) is true depends on whether or not we read it as (2a), (2b) or (2c).

If Read as (2a), (2) is False

Clearly enough, if we read (2) as (2a), then (2) is false.

Think about any case where something bad is about to happen, and God plans to bring about something good by allowing that thing to happen. Suppose, for example, that a homeless man (Tom) is on the verge of freezing to death, and suppose that, in order to actualize some good we can't foresee, God's plans include Tom's freezing to death.

It seems clear that, if you and I stumble across Tom in the park, we have a moral obligation to help him. But then, because God's plans include Tom's freezing to death, we have a moral obligation to interfere with what actually are God's plans. Things would be different, of course, if we knew about God's plans. But we don't. All we know is that Tom is about to freeze to death. And since this is all we know, we would be morally blameworthy if we didn't try to help him.

This, however, means that (2a) is false. So, if (2) is read as (2a), then, (2) is false, and the Argument from Moral Knowledge fails.

(2) is also False if Read as (2c)

Looking carefully, we can see that (2c) isn't any better than (2a).

Again, suppose we come across Tom in the park, an inch from freezing to death. You and I know that God sometimes lets bad things happen in order to bring about better things. As a result, we aren't in any position to say that God isn't planning on letting Tom freeze to death. So, for all we can tell, God's plans include Tom's freezing to death.

But we also know that God often stops bad things from happening, and we know that God often does so through people like you and me. So, for all we can tell, God's plans do not include Tom's freezing to death. Moreover, you and I know that God could easily stop us from interfering with His plans, so we reason that, if God really does plan on letting Tom freeze to death, He will somehow prevent us from warming Tom up.

What should we do, then? Given what we know — and given what we don't know — should we try to stop Tom from freezing to death, or not?

The answer seems obvious. It seems perfectly clear that we should try to prevent Tom from freezing. That is, it seems perfectly clear that we have a moral obligation to do so. But as we stipulated above, for all we know, God's plans include Tom's freezing to death. It follows that you and I have a moral obligation to interfere with what might (for all we know) be God's plans.

This, however, means that (2c) is false. So, if (2) is read as (2c), then, (2) is false, and the Argument from Moral Knowledge fails.

If Read as (2b), then the Argument is Invalid

So, if (2) is read as (2a) or (2c), then (2) is false. The only reading left, however, is (2b). Unfortunately for the Argument for Moral Knowledge, (2b) creates problems of its own.

If we read (2) as (2b), then the Argument from Moral Knowledge goes as follows:

(1) For all we know, God is planning on allowing Smith to copy the NIU and VT shootings.

(2b) It is always morally permissible for us to not try to interfere with what we know (or believe) are God's plans.

Therefore,

(3) For all we know, it would be morally permissible for us to not try to interfere with Smith's copying the NIU and VT shootings.

Formulated this way, the Argument from Moral Knowledge is a complete mess. Unlike (2a) and (2c), (2b) seems true. The problem is, (1) and (2b) do not entail (3), and this means that the Argument from Moral Knowledge is invalid.³

What (1) says is that, having thought about it, we can't be sure that God is not planning to allow Smith to copy the NIU and VT shootings. All (1) says is that we can't rule this possibility out. It doesn't say we know (or believe) anything in particular about God's plans. But this is what it would need to say to hook up appropriately with (2b). Given this lack of a connection between (1) and (2b), however, the fact that (1) and (2b) seem true gives us no reason to think (3) is true. The fact that (3) seems false is therefore no problem at all for belief in God.

So, if (2) is read as (2b), then once again, the Argument from Moral Knowledge fails.

In Summary

So, the Argument from Moral Knowledge doesn't cause a problem for our belief in God.

Of course, an upshot of our response to this argument is that, in a case where God plans on allowing something to happen but hasn't told us that He plans on allowing this thing to happen, we might have a moral obligation to try to interfere with this thing's happening. And no doubt, it is a little surprising that God has set things up this way. (Why, after all, would an omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect being set things up so that we sometimes have a moral obligation to try to interfere with His plans?) But this is surely no more surprising — and no more worth our worrying over — than many of the other ways God has set things up.

C O F F E E  S H O P

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What do you think of Blake's conclusion?

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The proper response to the Argument from Moral Knowledge, then, seems to be this: Hum. That's really interesting. I wonder why God set things up this way? And that's about it.